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This paper examines the emergence of firm-celebrity, both an intangible-asset, 
and a facilitator of competitive advantage.  Institutional approaches have asserted 
that  organizations  from  the  same  organizational  field  and  characterized  by 
comparable  structural  positions  face  similar  structural  forces.    These  result  in 
isomorphic tendencies, and similarities among firms.    But, in any organizational 
field,  differences  among  firms  also  exist.   Apart  from  research  on  variations 
resulting from intra-organization factors, however, firm-differentiating processes 
have not received much attention.  This paper focuses on various firm-external 
social constructions:  legitimacy, reputation, and status, and how they impact the 
emergence of firm-celebrity, a construct that helps to differentiate one firm from 
another.    The  paper  adopts  a  historical,  relationally  framed  approach,  which 
features a firm-celebrity case study. 
 
The recent calls by scholars for a greater coherence within management research between 
organizational analysis and social structure have yet to be fully heeded (Lounsbury & 
Ventresca, 2003).  There remains much work to be done in order to reap the benefits 
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gained from an expanded understanding of the relationships existing between 
organizations and other socially constructed, relationally situated, social-structures (and 
between the social structures, themselves).  Many have complained about a lack of effort 
in this area (Dobbin, 2008; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008).  They have called for less 
compartmentalized, relational studies examining inter-actions between agency and 
structure, and between structure and structure.  An existing problem, however, has been 
the existence of a dichotomy in research positions, with those championing atomistic, 
individualistic accounts tending to separate themselves from individuals promoting 
structural positions and vice versa (Heugens & Lander, 2009: 61).  Gaps exist. 
This study seeks to bridge these gaps.  Through an incorporation of the notion of 
fields, or realms consisting “of all relevant actors in a social space” (Dobbin, 2008: 56), it 
combines issues of agency with notions of social structure to show how a hierarchical 
framework of social standing emerges (Vandenberghe, 1999: 53).  Such an approach 
involves a focus not only on agency, but also on how “structured structures…function as 
structuring structures” (Bourdieu, quoted in Vandenberghe, 1999: 48).  The paper posits 
that the motivation for actors to undertake structurally influencing actions is not only the 
actors’ own hopes of achieving an improved action-environment for themselves, but also 
the actors’ cognizance, via an ongoing monitoring of their environment, of the 
competitive environments they face (White, 1981).  Individuals are aware of their social 
embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985), and this realization influences the actions they 
choose and the norms they follow.  Such a view is in line with the conceptualizations of 
social-exchange theorists, who believe that the success of social norms depends on 
mechanisms inherent within ongoing social relationships (Nee & Ingram, 1998: 24).    3 
In its formulation, the paper relies upon an inductively founded case-study, which 
draws its principal strength from an integration of theory and interview results, to 
investigate the manner by which a chosen organization, one situated in a non-U.S. based 
environment, garnered competitive advantage in the form of firm-celebrity (Rindova, 
Pollock & Hayward, 2006: 66).  The study heeds the current suggestions of scholars 
advocating a heightened focus on the “natural history” of organizations, wherein an 
enhanced understanding of organizational change is achieved through a reliance on a 
temporally based perspective, which gives weight to the manner by which organizational 
changes occur over time (Davis & Marquis, 2005: 333).  In addition, the paper also 
adopts a relational view (Emirbayer, 1997; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; White, 1992).  It 
focuses on the processes of narration, presentation, and action relied upon in the initiation 
and construction of the in-focus structural form.  The principal foci of the investigation 
are how, in a particular real-life situation, the celebrity-attainment process took place.   
A specific goal of the paper, one that is intended to help extend further the linkages 
between organizational analysis and social structure, is the fostering of understanding 
regarding the inter-relations between celebrity and three socially constructed intangible 
assets:  legitimacy, reputation, and status.  The little, existing work pertaining to firm 
celebrity, apart from theorizing about the methods actors should rely upon to achieve 
celebrity for their organizations, has actually tried to differentiate celebrity from these 
other constructs (Rindova, et al., 2006).  It has not attempted to relationally link celebrity 
with them.  In this paper, however, the center of attention is on how the processes of 
celebrity attainment depend upon its inter-relations with legitimacy, reputation, and 
status.  Such an approach is important because it shows the inter-linkages between the   4 
structures, not just at a particular instant, but also over time.  The significance of such a 
dynamic approach has been noted elsewhere (Barney, 2001: 51). 
This focus is not only important in and of itself, but more so given the fact that the 
research environment selected for the empirical portion of the paper is a non-U.S. 
situated one.  The preponderance of existing research concerning intangible assets has 
paid overwhelming attention to developments within the U.S., only.  The current study, 
given its China-situated location, offers the potential to add to overall understanding by 
unearthing insights regarding the possible outcomes in other, non-U.S. locales.  For 
example, with respect to issues of status in U.S.-focused research the key variable of 
consideration has tended to be the market ties an actor has with other high-status actors 
(Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Han, 1994).  These ties are said not only to promote 
information flow and resource acquisition, factors of critical importance to success within 
a market environment, but also to influence how others perceive an actor in terms of its 
quality and performance.  But the frameworks and results relied upon in these studies are 
premised on the existence of a strong market context.  It remains to be seen whether such 
ties are of similar importance in other societies, places where the market is less of a 
focus.  In fact, in hybrid economies, economies transitioning from a state-led economy to 
a more marketized one, a situation of “politicized capitalism” frequently exists (Nee & 
Opper, 2007).  And, under such a context, commercial action frequently depends on 
political connections.  Researchers have asserted that in these locales ties to the 
government should thus be of more significance than would be the case in market 
economies, where prices play more of a determining role (Ibid: 107).    5 
With respect to the ordering of this paper, I divide it into this introduction and four 
additional sections (one of which is the conclusion).  The first section (following the 
introduction) starts out with a discussion of celebrity, defining the construct and then 
shifting to a consideration of the manner by which firm-celebrity attainment has been 
characterized in existing literature.  Past depictions have emphasized the role of the 
media in this process, directing little attention to other important factors.  While the 
media certainly plays a critical role in the celebrity-development process, the stress in this 
paper is on how other intangible assets, legitimacy, status, and reputation, also relate.  
The paper puts forth various propositions concerning the roles of these constructs in the 
celebrity-development process.  The second section is made up of the empirical results 
from the case study.  It introduces the case-study subject, the Yiwu Small Commodities 
Market (subsequently referred to as Yiwu or the Yiwu marketplace), and outlines how 
this organization moved from a situation of near anonymity to become China’s most 
famous center of trade.  Given that in China there are now more than 4,000 marketplaces 
having total sales of over 100 million RMB (around USD15 million) annually (Song, 
Wang and Wang, 2008, P. 3), this has been no simple task.  The section summarizes the 
process of Yiwu’s celebrity development.  The third section, in a general sense, focuses 
on the relevance of the Yiwu story to celebrity scholarship interlinking the history of this 
process with a discussion of the paper’s earlier comments and formulated propositions.  
The paper’s fourth and concluding section presents a summary of the paper’s main 
points. 
   6 
FIRM-CELEBRITY, EXISTING VIEWS OF ITS CONSTRUCTION, AND HOW 
LEGITIMACY, REPUTATION AND STATUS RELATE  
What Is Firm-Celebrity? 
This paper defines firm-celebrity to be an outcome in which an organization garners 
significant attention from the public, while at the same time realizing “positive emotional 
responses from stakeholder audiences” (Rindova, et al., 2006: 50).  Celebrity is a social 
construction.  It is both a strategic resource (Barney 1991), and an intangible asset (Hall, 
1992).  Strategic resources are valuable, rare, non-imitable (uneasily copied), and non-
substitutable forms of organizational property.  Intangible assets are possessions that 
cannot be touched or seen, but that have value.  Scholars have directed significantly more 
attention to intangible-assets like reputation, status and legitimacy than they have to 
celebrity (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, and Sever, 2005; Podolny, 1993, 2005; 
Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Suddaby and 
Greenwood, 2005).   Celebrity remains an under-researched topic. 
 
Existing Frameworks Relating to the Construction of Firm-Celebrity 
In fact, firm-celebrity has received very little attention, and the attention it has 
received relates more to theory than to empirical investigations.  This is true of not only 
firm-celebrity, but also of celebrity in general.  Actually, the only paper to discuss 
succinctly the topic of firm-celebrity, as well as the processes by which an organization 
goes about achieving it, was a 2006, largely theoretical work by Rindova, et al. entitled, 
“Celebrity Firms:  The Social Construction of Market Popularity.”    In their paper,   7 
Rindova, et al. portray firm-celebrity in relational terms, referring to it as “a property of 
[an] actor’s relationship with an audience, rather than a characteristic of the actor 
him/her/itself” (2006: 51).  They contend that celebrity is different from other intangible 
assets, like reputation, status, and legitimacy, in at least three ways:  theoretical 
underpinnings, socio-cognitive foundations, and processes of emergence (Ibid: 54).  A 
large portion of the Rindova, et al. paper focuses on how firm-celebrity is unique as 
compared to the other intangible assets noted above.   
Two of the primary differences cited by Rindova, et al. pertain to how celebrity is 
theorized, and to the manner by which firm-celebrity comes into existence.  Although 
studies of the three other intangible assets “focus on how a firm’s behaviors and 
performance are evaluated, assuming that the firm is already noticed” (Ibid: 55), the 
authors of the Rindova, et al. paper assert that the focus of celebrity research is different.  
One difference is that celebrity does not emphasize evaluation (Ibid).  In addition to 
examining the unique qualities of firm-celebrity, Rindova, et al. also posit various 
propositions pertaining to the means by which the celebrity-attainment process should 
successfully unfold, stressing the role of the media, and asserting that in order to achieve 
celebrity-related success those engaged in relevant processes must rely upon the 
publicizing of dramatic narratives about the celebrity-seeking firm.  The authors contend 
that these narratives must encompass a conflict situation (involving a disruption of the 
status-quo), in which the firm is portrayed in the role of a non-conforming, likeable 
protagonist possessing a well-developed character (Ibid: 57-65).  According to Rindova, 
et al., agents of the firm need also be involved in the celebrity-construction process in the 
sense that they take an active role in actions intended “to project desired images to   8 
audiences” (Ibid: 62).  Such transmission involves the application of impression 
management, encompassing mechanisms like storytelling (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zilber, 2007), and the production of “information subsidies” 
(Rindova, et al., 2006: 62).  Information subsidies are packaged accounts of firm actions 
that are directly issued to media representatives to enhance perceptions of the firm’s 
importance, and which contribute to the heightening of the firm’s celebrity standing.   
Rindova, et al. also discuss the manner by which firm-celebrity might be sustained.  
The authors posit that “celebrity is not static over time” (Ibid: 63), and that its 
continuance depends on the later ability of a firm to “overconform” to existing norms 
(Ibid).  That is, once a firm has achieved celebrity, it must shed its rebel image of non-
conformance and present itself as a leader in the enhancement of existing social norms 
(Ibid: 63-65).  This is one of the few portions of the paper that refers directly to the 
positive relation of firm-celebrity to another of the three intangible assets referred to 
earlier.  This occurs when Rindova, et al. remark that “By moving away form its previous 
nonconforming behavior and adopting behaviors that conform to industry norms, a firm 
can increase its legitimacy and appeal to a broader market” (Ibid: 64).  In addition, 
although not a direct reference to one of the other intangible-assets, the paper also implies 
the importance of reputation to the firm-celebrity attainment process when it states that 
celebrity “cannot be fully fabricated” (Ibid: 66).  A further illustration of reputation’s 
importance is apparent in the comment that “the attention and positive emotional 
responses from audiences that define celebrity depend on the sustained perception that 
celebrated firms—at least to some extent—possess the extraordinary qualities attributed 
to them” (Ibid).  Still, generally the direct linkages within the Rindova, et al. paper   9 
between firm-celebrity and the legitimacy, status and reputation constructs are few and 
far between. 
 
A Framework Integrating Legitimacy, Reputation, and Status with the Firm-
Celebrity Development Process  
In this section of the paper I attempt to expand upon the notion of firm-celebrity by 
bringing into the discussion a focus on the three other, previously referred to intangible-
assets:  legitimacy, reputation and status.  Rather than differentiating firm-celebrity from 
these other constructs, as Rindova, et al. did in their paper, the goal here is to show how 
firm-celebrity dynamically relates to them.  I rely upon a historical perspective to do so, 
beginning with a discussion of legitimacy.  Legitimacy is a social construction, whose 
emergence depends on two elements.  First, actors within a social field begin to believe 
that a majority or a large percentage of actors within their field view a particular social 
structuring or manner of doing things as being acceptable and desirable (referred to as 
propriety) (Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006: 55).  Second, these actors agree that this 
action/structure template is one that deserves application elsewhere (referred to as 
validity) (Ibid).  Legitimacy is defined by Suchman as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (1995, P. 574).  It 
is frequently categorized into three types:  normative (i.e., endorsements, affiliations, 
adherence to established practices), regulative (i.e., action in line with existing laws, 
certifications), and cognitive (i.e., taken-for-grantedness, attainment of valued credentials   10 
(e.g., education), seeming acceptance of established forms of action) (Ruef & Scott, 
1998).  Legitimacy is critical to the structuring of relations given that it “is a necessary 
precondition to initiating social ties with stakeholders and obtaining and recombining 
resources” (Delmar and Shane, 2004, P. 386).  It is structural in the sense that it generally 
segments actors into two groups:  those possessing legitimacy and those who don’t.  
While there is often also a grey area of intersection between the two sets, made up of 
actors who possess some legitimacy, but who are still not fully legitimated, a prerequisite 
for relationship formation is generally that interacting actors first attain a mutually 
defined level of legitimacy, which then allows the relationship to progress.   
Though Rindova, et al. emphasized the role of the media in the process of firm-
celebrity attainment, legitimacy is also important in this process if for no other reason 
than because there are precursors to the media’s involvement.  The media has a choice in 
terms of the actors it will highlight, and there are often many, from whom it can select 
that can serve as “vivid examples of important changes in industries and society in 
general” (Rindova, et al., 2006: 52).  Generally speaking, apart from being forced to do 
so, the media will not support an actor that it does not appreciate, condone, or believe to 
be acceptable.  But the media must also take into account the opinions of those on whom 
it depends for the resources that sustain it (money being the primary one), which in the 
U.S. tend to be media advertisers (though in China they are oftentimes powerful, purse-
holding government officials).  Overall, legitimated actors will possess a higher 
probability of being chosen.  Legitimacy does not need to be field-wide, with every 
involved participant believing that any one particular actor should be supported.  But at 
least most media representatives and their supporters must believe that an actor is worthy   11 
of their backing.  There is thus a threshold of legitimacy required for a firm to 
successfully attain celebrity (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002: 428).  This leads to the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 1:  Legitimacy is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
firm-celebrity attainment. 
 
Reputation, or “the beliefs and evaluations held by external members” about a 
particular actor (Fischer & Reuber, 2007: 55), also plays a role in the firm-celebrity 
development process.  Like legitimacy above, reputation is relational in nature.  
Reputations are generally based on comparisons among different entities, which in the 
case here are organizations from the same industry or field.  Key decision-makers 
frequently rely on reputations (and status) when deciding whom to affiliate with (Jensen 
& Roy 2008), and, as Fobrum and Shanley contend:  “Well-reputed firms have a 
competitive advantage within their industries, but poorly reputed firms are 
disadvantaged” (1990: 235).  Such an impact is not just limited to industry effects alone, 
but it also influences wider field outcomes as well.   
In considering reputation’s relation to this discussion, various questions emerge.   
For example, to what extent are performance and reputation linked?  Also, to what degree 
does reputation impact firm-celebrity outcomes?  That is, will the firm with the best 
reputation necessarily become the most famous organization?  As for the first question, 
research has shown that there is generally a relationship between reputation and 
performance, especially when reputation is associated with prominence, in the sense of 
“the extent to which an organization is widely recognized in its organizational field”   12 
(Rindova, et al., 2005: 1044).  Prominence relates to the degree to which institutional 
intermediaries (such as the media and other evaluating bodies), and high-status actors 
favor a particular entity.  The relationship between reputation and performance is 
particularly evident with regard to financial performance (Deephouse & Carter, 2005; 
Fobrum & Shanley, 1990).  Good financial performance tends to impact reputation 
favorably, and once a reputation is formed it very often persists (Roberts & Dowling, 
2002).  This implies that performance and reputation are mutually sustaining, building 
upon each other (Ibid).  Such a suggestion meshes with the notion of the “Matthew 
Effect” referred to by Merton (1968), asserting that any actor of high status tends to 
benefit disproportionately from actions it undertakes as compared to the results of similar 
actions engaged in by lower status actors.   
In general, however, research focusing on the relation of reputation and 
performance has been conducted in market environments, where information diffusion is 
quite high and conditions relatively transparent.  But, in situations of uncertainty, where 
performance outcomes are not always clear, reputation becomes even more important 
because it can “help overcome imperfections in the markets for knowledge” 
(Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2007: 38).  Reputation thus plays a particularly helpful and 
critical role in transitioning environments, where infrastructures and institutional contexts 
are frequently underdeveloped, and the flow of accurate information is poor.  This is 
because in such environments actors, in coming to conclusions about a particular entity, 
rely more heavily upon signaling processes and other externally apparent clues (as 
opposed to direct knowledge transfer) than they do in other contexts. 
The question is how do reputation and firm-celebrity relate?  To answer this   13 
question it must again be noted that reputation is relational in nature.  Reputation depends 
on comparisons to evolve.  It is also a structured, categorical construct in the sense that 
comparisons are made among entities that are viewed as being of a similar type or of the 
same category.  This comparison process is one that requires the categorization of actors 
into a group, and then, based on the standing of actors within this group, reputations 
arise.  But, such a process is oftentimes problematic, particularly in a situation where a 
new organizational field is emerging.  Under such a context, comparisons among group 
members are difficult to ascertain simply because there are few members of the group to 
compare, and also because the situations of existing group members are poorly defined.  
Reputations are, in consequence, difficult to determine.  It is possible, however, that in a 
situation like this actors are compared not as members of the same industry or based on 
some other apparent linkage, but instead on a more intangible characteristic.  They can be 
compared, for example, on some aspect of their abilities, like aptitudes regarding 
innovation, iconoclastic potential, potential to deliver value, or some other grouping.  
These comparisons are not only useful in determining reputations, but they also act to 
distinguish an actor from a group that it might otherwise normally be compared with, a 
group whose members are defined by a more common characteristic, such as industry, 
demographic type, or the like.  Hence, a kind of “decoupling” (Nee, 1998: 88), or re-
framing process can emerge in which ongoing events and occurrences take on different 
meanings, thus engendering new ontological foundations (Benford & Snow, 2000: 614).  
This process pertains to firm-celebrity creation in the sense that a possible-outcome of 
such reframing is for actors to attain standing as a non-conforming protagonist, heavily 
involved in the transformation of the status-quo.  This is a footing that it might not   14 
otherwise (if judged from previously existing perspectives) be able to obtain.  And, the 
attainment of this standing makes the actor a highly suitable candidate for media 
promotion, given that there consequently (when judged from the differing perspective) 
exists an interesting and worthwhile story to tell.  But, possessing a reputation as a non-
conformist is not sufficient for a firm to maintain existing celebrity.  As the firm becomes 
better known it must also show that its celebrity standing does not conflict sharply with 
in-place normative, regulative and cognitive standards.  A positive reputation, therefore, 
is increasingly required.  Minus such a reputation, firm-celebrity will be short lived.  This 
leads to the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 2a:  For new firms, located in emerging organizational fields, 
although  legitimacy  precedes  reputation  in  importance,  the  reputation-
seeking process is a critical step in the attainment of firm-celebrity.  This 
is  because,  if  they  are t o  achieve  celebrity,  firms  need  to  distinguish 
themselves  from  their  competitors.    This  involves  the  establishment  of 
reputation. 
 
Proposition 2b:  For firm-celebrity to develop further, there is a need for 
the  establishment  of  a  positively  perceived  firm-reputation,  one  that  is 
increasingly  associated  with  over-conformance,  as  opposed  to  non-
conformance. 
 
The third of the intangible-asset structures (apart from firm-celebrity) referred to in   15 
this paper is status.  Status is a hierarchical, social construct that is based not so much on 
any particular quality of involved actors, but rather on the positions actors hold within a 
social framework.  Like reputation, it is categorical in nature, in the sense that it 
structures actors into differentiated, general groupings of superiority, equality, or 
inferiority (Chan & Goldthorpe, 2007: 1097).  Status helps to determine who will interact 
with whom, and thus has relevance to the “liability of newness” notion (Stinchcombe, 
1965: 148), wherein new organizations face a much more difficult survival situation than 
do their more established counterparts.  One reason for this newness liability is that 
resource-rich actors tend to be of high status, but have (often intentionally) little 
interactions with those of lower status.  Start-up organizations, with little status, thus are 
faced with difficulty.  Not only do they generally lack resources, but, because of their 
lower-status standing, they have little opportunity to interact with those possessing the 
resources they need.  They thus, in part due to a lack of resources, have a hard time of 
becoming established.  That is, the same actor possessing different levels of status will be 
treated in different ways, and will find his/her situation affected by this, something also 
referred to as the Matthew Effect (Merton, 1968).  Joel Podolny uses the example of 
professional golfer, Lee Trevino, to illustrate this.  He quotes Trevino as saying, “When I 
was a rookie, I told jokes and no one laughed.  After I began winning tournaments, I told 
the same jokes, and all of a sudden, people thought they were funny” (2005: 10).   
What then is the relationship between status and firm-celebrity development?  This 
depends on the life-course situation of the firm under consideration.  For the new firm, 
lacking celebrity, mid-level status can actually work against the celebrity-development 
process.  This is because this status often limits the ability of an actor to take on a role as   16 
a non-conformer, which is often necessary for the initiation of the celebrity-attainment 
process.  There are obviously cases where the high status of a new firm can promote 
celebrity, as in a situation where a brilliant, iconoclastic researcher leaves a well-known, 
established firm to start up a new firm.  Due to the researcher’s established legitimacy, 
reputation and status, the new organization almost instantaneously becomes a celebrity-
firm.  But, high-status actors, like those of low status, have action freedoms that those of 
middle status do not possess (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001).   
Still, for those firms without status, once a firm is on its way to becoming or has 
already become a celebrity, it then needs to quickly acquire status in order to maintain its 
standing.  This is because the firm needs to shift from being a non-conformer to 
becoming a conformer, and then move on to become an over-conformer (Rindova, et al., 
2006: 63-65).  This results in a fourth proposition: 
 
Proposition 3:  For a new, un-established firm, status is not a necessary 
condition  for  the d evelopment  of  firm-celebrity.    Once  celebrity  is 
achieved,  however,  status  is  required  to  attain  the  over-conforming 
standing needed for celebrity’s continuance and further development. 
 
One additional facet of the relationship between firm-celebrity and status that 
requires attention relates to the types of status that a celebrity-firm will need if it is to be 
viewed as an over-conforming actor.  The assertion made here is that the social structure 
of the situation under consideration must be taken into account.  The reason is because 
different societies possess differing norms of social status, with these norms being related   17 
to the power-distributions found within the societies.  In the empirical case of interest in 
this paper, a situation characterized by a transition of an economy from a state-led to a 
more market-dominated form, a process commonly referred to as “market transition” 
(Nee, 1992, 1996), politicized capitalism should be evident.  Under such a context, 
significant power continues to reside in the state, and thus the attainment of status should 
depend heavily on networks developed between the organization and high-ranking 
political leaders.  Based on this, I posit the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4:  In a situation characterized by politicized capitalism, the 
status  required  by  a  celebrity-firm  to  transform  itself  into  an  over-
conforming actor should depend on the development of ties between the 
organization and relevant, high-ranking political leaders. 
 
Something else that needs to be mentioned regarding the development of firm-
celebrity involves a focus on resources.  The focus I refer to is, however, not like that 
developed in resource-based views of the firm, which examine “the resources and 
capabilities of firms that enable them to generate above-normal rates of return and a 
sustainable competitive advantage” (Oliver, 1997: 697), but rather is one associated with 
the basic resources required by a firm to assure its own survival.  According to Pfeffer 
and Salancik, firm survival is premised on the ability of the organization “to acquire and 
sustain resources” (1978: 2).  The assertion here is that if a firm is to acquire celebrity 
standing it must have available to it the resources needed to do so.  This resource package   18 
will differ by firm, but the importance of the resource-development process to firm-
celebrity attainment will be true for all firms.  While this is perhaps common sense, it is a 
point that needs to be emphasized.  This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5:  In order to successfully attain celebrity standing, firms 
must possess the abilities needed to develop and acquire the resources 
they need to achieve the desired celebrity outcome.   
 
The next section offers an empirical summary of the firm-celebrity development 
process of the Yiwu marketplace, a now famous organization in China.  Yiwu is both a 
real-life example of celebrity attainment, and it is also useful in helping to determine 
whether the propositions outlined above are confirmed by actual results. 
 
HOW DID AN INITIALLY UNKNOWN MARKETPLACE GO ON TO BECOME 
CHINA’S MOST FAMOUS CENTER OF TRADE?  THE YIWU STORY  
An Introduction to the Yiwu Markeplace 
Yiwu is located at about the geographical midpoint of Zhejiang Province (in 
China’s east-central region), and an approximately two-hour train ride to the southwest of 
Shanghai.  In 1978, the year in which China’s market-transition process began, Yiwu was 
a relatively unknown locale, with few outstanding features.  It was small in size, having 
an area of only 2 square kilometers (as compared to the 800 square kilometers now) 
(12/08/08 Yiwu interview), and a relatively small population.  In the words of one   19 
interviewee, a former Zhejiang Province newspaper reporter, originally responsible for 
covering economic happenings in Yiwu, “When I first went to Yiwu in 1983 there was 
only one, small road in the place.  It was like a farm town, with few people and a limited 
land area.  It really had nothing.  There was not much there to write about, except perhaps 
for the small market.  None of us thought Yiwu would ever develop” (11/29/08 
Hangzhou interview).  On a scale of one to a hundred, Yiwu’s China-wide celebrity at the 
time that reforms commenced would have been close to zero.   
The contrast with the Yiwu of today is substantial.  Yiwu is now a city of about 
700,000 registered residents (holding Yiwu residence permits (hukou)), and over a 
million other persons living there on a long-term and ongoing basis.  Not only has 
Yiwu’s population increased, but so too has its level of celebrity.  In fact, for a city of its 
size, Yiwu is currently among the most famous places in China.  The thing that has made 
Yiwu special has been the nature of its post-reform development.  The following 
breakdown gives some perspective as to how impressive Yiwu’s performance has been: 
Between 1978 and 2007, the Yiwu district’s total value of production increased from 
128 million RMB to 41 billion RMB, 319 times the original amount, an average yearly 
increase of 22%; financial income for the city went from 20 million RMB to 5.888 
billion RMB, 293.4 times the original amount, representing an average yearly increase 
of 21.6%; the holdings of banks and other financial institutions in the city increased 
from 30 million RMB to 85.56 billion RMB, 2851 times the original amount, for an 
average yearly increase of 31.6%; during the period the breakdown of the three forms 
of production makeup (1. agricultural, 2. industrial, and 3. service) went from 57.8: 
21.1: 21.1 to the revised grouping of 2.4: 46.3: 51.3.  In 2006, of the 100 top county 
level cities in China, Yiwu was ranked 12
th (after being previously unranked in 1978),   20 
and in terms of its overall competitiveness within Zhejiang Province, Yiwu was ranked 
first when compared with other similarly sized cities.
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Of late, Yiwu’s achievements have been widely noted, and its celebrity is without 
question.  The city has been lauded on multiple recent occasions as a symbol of China’s 
post reform success.  It has recently been featured in several documentaries appearing on 
China’s national TV station, CCTV, and has also been the subject of various well-known 
studies by government-related institutes.  Even prior to these events, in May 2006, the 
Zhejiang Provincial government cited Yiwu as a model of development and suggested 
that all government bodies throughout the province learn from its experiences. 
Obviously, Yiwu’s performance has impacted its recent celebrity.  Because of its 
success, Yiwu has become known throughout China as a paradigm of achievement.  
Given that in today’s China there are now (based on 2007 statistics) 4,121 markets that 
have annual trade volumes of 100 million RMB or more (Song, Wang and Wang, 2008, 
P. 3), Yiwu does not lack for competition.  Yet, the Yiwu marketplace has, for more than 
20 years, been ranked by China’s Ministry of Commerce as the number one market in the 
nation.  This is the case even though there are other markets that surpass the Yiwu 
marketplace in total overall sales.  But, there is no market in China that can match 
Yiwu’s standing in terms of celebrity.  The efforts to build this standing have been 
unending.  They have met with great success.  The following comment from an official 
associated with Yiwu’s marketplace organization illustrates this:  “We’ve been very 
                                                        
1 See:  http://gd.people.com.cn/GB?123946/8143881.html   21 
successful in the ongoing and diligent efforts we’ve made at publicizing Yiwu.  Yiwu is 
now extremely well known throughout China and is seen as a dynamic, innovative place 
that people, particularly entrepreneurs, want to come to in search of riches.  Attracting 
such people has been critical to our success” (6/13/08 Yiwu interview).   
Wherever one goes in China, the mention of Yiwu elicits immediate reaction, 
with people quickly making reference to the city’s markets.  Proof of this came through 
59 author-conducted interviews carried out at three different markets in China, markets 
located in Wuhan (Hubei Province) (19 interviews), Beijing (20 interviews), and Jinan 
(Shandong Province) (20 interviews).  The markets selected for the interviews were all 
associated with a product category in which Yiwu is not competitive:  clothing items.  In 
fact, this choice, the decision to interview sellers of clothing, was deliberate.  My hope 
was to see how Yiwu’s standing would compare with other markets, which are more 
associated with the clothing trade than Yiwu, markets like Changshu (Jiangsu), 
Guangzhou (Guangdong), and Shijiazhuang (Hebei).  One might assume that those 
selling clothing would know these markets better than they knew Yiwu.  This was not the 
case, however.  The full breakdown of the conducted interviews can be found in 
Appendix One.  A summary of the results, however, shows that about 63% of the 
interviewees, when asked “Do you think any other market in China can compare with 
Yiwu?” responded with a “no,” or “not sure.”  Again, this was surprising given the 
interviewees’ product linkages, ties to products in which Yiwu is less competitive.  There 
were only about 3% of respondents who had never heard of the city, even though there 
are 2,862 cities in China, which, like Yiwu, are classified to be county-level forms (xian 
ji chengshi).  Of the characteristics cited as being most representative of Yiwu, 83% of   22 
respondents cited markets, about 58% made reference to small commodities, 44% 
indicated that they viewed Yiwu as a center of wealth, and, 14% mentioned the strong 
commercial abilities of Yiwu market participants.  One surprising response was that 
approximately 18% of the respondents believed Yiwu to be a major clothing market, 
even though this is not actually true.  The combined responses were quite interesting 
given that only 20% of the interviewees said that they had ever been to the city.  The 
responses to these interviews, combined with Yiwu’s history of performance and its top-
market billing, lend credence to the city’s celebrity standing.   
 
Yiwu’s Legitimacy, Reputation and Status during the Early-Reform Period 
The early development of the Yiwu marketplace was a self-catalyzed one, a 
bottom-up process, which depended on the efforts and entrepreneurial abilities of the 
Yiwu people to carry out.  What is of interest in this paper, however, is the process by 
which Yiwu became a celebrity-firm, and how this standing has helped Yiwu achieve 
competitive advantage.  The paper focuses on the roles of legitimacy, reputation and 
status in this process, examining the perceptions of outside stakeholders and how, and in 
what ways, relevant-Yiwu actors took strategic action to influence these perceptions to 
its benefit.  This is not to say that the observations of those within the Yiwu organization 
itself did not matter, but with respect to celebrity attainment, the views of outside 
stakeholders mattered more.   The paper will first discuss the early standing situations of 
the three constructs, individually.   23 
LEGITMACY  In a general sense, at the start, and for the first few years of China’s 
reforms Yiwu possessed little legitimacy.   The unique forms of activity (predicated on 
market exchange) emerging in Yiwu were not fully compatible with the expectations of 
society, largely because these expectations were themselves undefined and in a state of 
flux.  Normatively, there existed in China much conflict regarding what exactly the 
government and people should condone and what they should oppose.  Many people, 
particularly officials, were unwilling to commit their public support to any new forms of 
action.  Significant uncertainty existed.  From a regulative standpoint, there was little 
legal clarity, with many existing laws (particularly economic laws) having lost their 
meaning, and with new laws not yet formalized.  Cognitively, among many there was a 
significant questioning of what to believe in.   There were also few markets in existence 
similar to Yiwu, which actors could point to as justification for Yiwu’s structural and 
action templates.  In fact, throughout China, and especially in Yiwu, numerous social 
contradictions were evident.  While there were supporters of Yiwu, there were also many 
who opposed it.  Nobody, however, seemed to be sure as to whether markets would 
continue or not.  Markets were therefore not openly discussed.  According to one 
interviewee, even among Yiwu’s provincial and central government supporters “there 
existed a mindset wherein [the officials] pretended the Yiwu market did not exist.  They 
knew it was here, but they didn’t see it” (10/12/08 Yiwu interview).  Up until the late 
1980s Yiwu continued to be a kind of non-entity, and in the words of one Yiwu 
propaganda official, “Early on there were three upper-hierarchy political policies 
regarding Yiwu:  1) no press coverage; 2) no direct expression of opinion regarding 
Yiwu’s situation; and, 3) no overnight stays in Yiwu.” (9/27/08 Yiwu interview).  The   24 
former head of Yiwu’s Department of Propaganda conceded that, “increasing Yiwu’s 
fame through the promotion of Yiwu in outside areas was not our major priority, at least 
not until the late 1980s” (12/08/08 Yiwu interview).  Under conditions of high 
uncertainty, nobody was sure if the Yiwu marketplace harbored the potential to be 
legitimized or not. 
Regardless, during the 1980s, one of the focuses of Yiwu government leaders was 
still to try actively to legitimate the Yiwu marketplace (11/01/08 Yiwu interview).  A 
major reason for this was because, apart from the marketplace, there was not much else 
in Yiwu that possessed any strong hope for development, and the upper leaders were 
aware of this.  They also knew that their own success, as was the case for other officials 
throughout China, depended on the developmental situations of the community they 
oversaw.  But to develop the market, Yiwu’s leaders needed to garner active support for 
the marketplace from outside sources (particularly at the Zhejiang provincial level).  
Yiwu was short of resources and had little standing.  Such efforts, however, even when 
considered from a theoretical standpoint (Suchman, 1995: 575), were difficult, largely 
because many marketplace participants actually just wanted to be left alone.  They were 
not interested in forming linkages with the outside, apart from the ties they already had 
(mostly with other Yiwu’ers located in other parts of China).  This is because, at the time, 
Yiwu and its markets were simply a point of distribution.  Little production occurred 
there, Yiwu traders took on the roles of exchange conduits, bringing goods produced in 
other areas (mostly Guangdong, Dongbei (Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang Provinces) 
and other Zhejiang locations) to Yiwu and reselling them to other Yiwu natives, who 
would then take them to other markets, reselling them there for substantial profits.  Yiwu   25 
traders were service providers, and the service they provided was one based on 
knowledge and information.  They were successful in their activities because there was 
huge demand for products and a lack of outside knowledge concerning how to access 
these products.  Yiwu residents, because of their previous involvement in trade (even 
prior to reforms, Yiwu residents had been involved, often illegally, in trading activity), 
knew how to find and utilize sources of product.  They were also skilled at getting the 
goods to Yiwu for further distribution elsewhere (services undertaken by other Yiwu 
natives), and Yiwu logistics services were superior to those of other places.  A kind of 
monopoly in distribution arose.  Yiwu traders believed, however, that their success was 
possible only “because nobody knew about Yiwu.  Most people didn’t know you could 
come to Yiwu to do business, and those from Yiwu would purposely not tell outsiders 
about the Yiwu situation, or tell them where they were from.  Early on, the Yiwu market 
was an Yiwu market only” (10/13/08a Yiwu interview).  The Yiwu traders did not want 
Yiwu to become well known because they feared that if it were that this knowledge 
would then diminish their own prosperity.  They did not even write down their Yiwu 
addresses on the products they were selling, because they did not want others to know 
where they were from (12/16/08 Yiwu interview).  They also did not welcome the arrival 
of outsiders who they felt might end up taking away from them money-making 
opportunities.  This situation extended into the early 1990s, after which time adjustments 
began to occur.   
Even so, throughout the period senior local-leaders and those among the Zhejiang 
provincial hierarchy who supported market reforms (and as a result, Yiwu), continued to 
make efforts to legitimize the marketplace and its operations.  These efforts were   26 
strategic in nature, and included the application of educational and propaganda 
mechanisms to establish local (county and provincial levels) validation for the Yiwu 
model, and to link Yiwu with previously legitimated forms.  But, at the local level, 
“lower-level bureaucrats were a problem.  There were many among them who were not 
advocates of markets.  Their opposition arose due to their discomfort concerning some of 
the consequences of market development.  Through market participation, farmers, who 
the officials viewed as being of comparatively low status, were beginning to make more 
money than they were and the officials resented this.  They in turn made efforts to 
constrain market development.  Higher-ranking local officials therefore focused a 
significant part of the party’s propaganda efforts towards educating the Yiwu people 
(particularly the bureaucrats) as to the benefits of markets.  We wanted the markets to 
succeed” (12/08/08b interview).  Another reason for emphasizing the local level was that 
there also existed opposition to Yiwu “from the local state-businesses.  They were 
bothered by the market’s improved competitiveness.  Yiwu was having a big impact on 
the prices at which goods were being sold, and the state monopoly was being eroded, 
with monopoly gains no longer possible” (October 6, 2008 Yiwu interview).  Yiwu’s 
administrators made efforts to deal with this opposition.  They needed to garner the 
acceptance of the leaders of the local state firms so as to undertake further market 
developments.  Otherwise, the leaders could make trouble. 
Various Province officials who were supporters of market reforms, individuals like 
Shen Zulun (who later became Zhejiang’s governor), Li Dexin, and Dong Chaochai), 
also made efforts to help Yiwu legitimize itself.  For example, in 1985 Shen Zulun took 
the risk of including a report, entitled “Encourage Business to Develop Our Counties,   27 
Develop Yiwu Vigorously,” which discussed the positives of markets, as a key part of a 
widely publicized provincial meeting, the Zhejiang Provincial Agricultural Township 
Working Symposium.  The meeting gave Yiwu its first major opportunity to achieve 
positive, province-wide exposure (11/01/08 Yiwu interview).  The aim of this exposure 
was directed solely towards legitimating the Yiwu form of development, and improving 
Yiwu’s overall reputation (11/01/08 Yiwu interview).  Shen also helped Yiwu gain 
provincial permission and some financial support for its early market expansions.  
Without such assistance these expansions would probably not have occurred, or at a 
minimum they would have been extremely difficult to carry out.  This assistance was 
thus critical to Yiwu’s early success. 
One other early legitimation effort was to try and intentionally link Yiwu with 
already legitimated forms of action from China’s planning past in order to heighten 
Yiwu’s “acceptability” among decision-makers.  Although Yiwu’s situation differed 
substantially from China’s traditional jishi, or periodic markets, at the beginning of the 
marketplace’s development, Yiwu’s leaders consistently referred to Yiwu as such an 
economic form.  They also ongoingly talked about Yiwu’s development as one 
predicated on a variety of already acceptable elements:  planned and small-scale (geti) 
efforts, as opposed to behavior of a more capitalist nature; the sale of small commodities, 
rather than industrially produced items; and the involvement of poor farmers, who 
otherwise had few other opportunities for support (Jinhua Department of Industry and 
Commerce, 1982: 1).   
At the same time as all of these developments were taking place, institutional 
processes of legitimization were occurring as well.  Macro-level ideologies and laws   28 
were undergoing change, and this helped to make Yiwu more acceptable.  That is, the 
central state was playing a role in market legitimation (Nee, 2000).  Yiwu administrators 
were aware of these changes and attempted to portray Yiwu as aligned with them, for 
example framing Yiwu as a form of Deng Xiaoping thinking (12/08/08 Yiwu interview).  
Also, from a population-ecology perspective (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1988), as the 
number (or density) of marketplaces increased, Yiwu’s acceptability as an organizational 
form naturally improved.  All of these macro-level changes played a role in Yiwu’s 
overall legitimation process, leading to enhanced legitimacy for Yiwu.  Overall, then, at 
least with respect to issues of legitimacy, this early-reform period was a time when the 
foundations for later celebrity emergence were being formed. 
REPUTATION According to one interviewee, “Prior to 1990 the efforts of Yiwu 
administrators were primarily focused on legitimating Yiwu” (11/01/08 Yiwu interview), 
with these efforts being overwhelmingly local in nature (11/03/08 Yiwu interview).  One 
reason for such an approach was the fact that in the 1980s information flow in China was 
severely limited, with the number of newspapers and other publications very restricted 
(10/20/08 Hangzhou interview).  Even so, by around 1988 Yiwu was becoming 
increasingly well known (11/29/08 Hangzhou interview).  But, the reputation Yiwu was 
developing was mixed.  On the one hand it began to be represented, particularly by Yiwu 
and various Zhejiang officials, as a paragon of market success.  But, on the other hand it 
was becoming known as a center of fake products and of goods that were of poor quality.  
Regarding this latter standing, state-owned firms, particularly in Shanghai, whose 
products were being copied and sold in the Yiwu markets as the real thing, but at lower 
prices, were targeting Yiwu as an improper economic-actor.  One reason for this was   29 
because, for the most part, consumers did not know that the products being sold in Yiwu 
were imitations.  When used, however, the items were of poor quality, impacting the 
standing of those firms whose labels were being copied.  The firms began to send 
representatives to Yiwu and Hangzhou (the capital of Zhejiang) to file complaints, and to 
enlist newspapers from their own areas, particularly in Shanghai, to write reports critical 
of Yiwu.  These efforts, however, did not have significant impact.  This was because 
Yiwu was still a largely local market and “even the [Zhejiang] Provincial government 
didn’t pay much attention to the situation preferring to do its best to ignore Yiwu” 
(2/16/09 Yiwu interview).  There was one sense, however, in which Yiwu’s reputation 
was impacting its development and potential celebrity, and this was with respect to 
Yiwu’s reputation among other Zhejiang entrepreneurs.  By 1988, individuals from 
Wenzhou and Taizhou, two entrepreneurially focused Zhejiang communities, had begun 
to come to Yiwu.  They were attracted to Yiwu by the reputation of Yiwu’s government 
for openness and support of business activity.  This reputation included the fact that taxes 
in Yiwu were comparatively low (as a result of a policy instituted by an early, Yiwu 
Party Secretary, Xie Gaohua), as were stall rents.  The market itself also had a reputation 
as being a good location for doing business, characterized by comparatively inexpensive 
logistics fees and significant opportunities.  The process of outside actors coming into the 
market began to stimulate the formation of new, useful business networks and increased 
the overall diversity of Yiwu (differentiating it from emerging competitors adding further 
to positive reputation effects (Fombrun, 1996: 393)).  The outcomes brought Yiwu 
rewards.  They also resulted in an increase in the size of the marketplace, which further 
enhanced Yiwu’s reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990: 250), and correspondingly its   30 
celebrity.  Early on, then, reputation formation did play a role with respect to Yiwu’s 
firm-celebrity development process, but this role was not a large one. 
STATUS  As a new entity, involved in questionable activities, ones which 
constrained the ties it was able to form with powerful, established actors, Yiwu early-on 
possessed little status.  The vast majority of high-status political actors, in particular, 
were unwilling to form close ties with it.  At the same time, however, Yiwu’s low status 
was, as theorized by previous research, useful in its ability to take on non-conforming 
status (Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001).  Also, given that during the early post-reform 
period there were few competitors (though this number was continually increasing) with 
whom Yiwu had to compete, there still did not exist hierarchies of status that Yiwu had 
to be concerned with, and which restrained it in its actions.  In this sense, Yiwu was 
relatively unrestricted in what it could do and the relationships it could form.  While this 
presented difficulties in the sense that as a path-breaking organization Yiwu had no pre-
established template to follow, and no other organization to emulate, particularly early on 
when it even lacked the opportunity to rely on benchmarking mechanisms to guide it 
(though this situation rapidly changed) (Still & Strang, 2009), but, in another sense, the 
situation was ideal, because Yiwu could establish itself on its own terms, without the 
need to justify its actions.  Thus, early on, it appears that status was not a primary factor 
impacting Yiwu’s celebrity potential. 
In summary, Yiwu’s priority, in the aftermath of the formal establishment of its 
market, was initially centered on self-legitimation.  Legitimation efforts took various 
forms, and were directed towards achieving a base of support for Yiwu’s mode of 
development.  Yiwu administrators made their first priority the solidifying and   31 
standardizing of local support, attempting to bring conformity of focus to all Yiwu 
organizational-actors.  The means used to accomplish this were mechanisms of education 
and propaganda, which stressed the appropriateness of Yiwu and the society-wide 
benefits of its operations.  Yiwu’s efforts at legitimacy also focused on identifying and 
developing support at the provincial-government level and using this support to its own 
benefit.  In all of these actions, Yiwu administrators attempted to frame Yiwu’s 
developments as a general adherence with existing norms.  They positioned Yiwu as a 
kind of periodic market (a form already acceptable within Chinese society), one that was 
bringing great benefits to Yiwu’s rural residents, who were portrayed as being akin to the 
salt of the earth.  Additionally, Yiwu attempted to line itself up with institutional changes 
taking place at the macro level.  It ongoingly portrayed itself as an embodiment of 
Dengist (Deng Xiaoping, the then leader of China) philosophies.   
Issues of reputation and status took a backseat to legitimation efforts.  This is 
logical given that legitimacy is “a critical ingredient for new venture success” (Starr & 
MacMillan, 1990: 83).  Also, in the absence of legitimacy new firms generally face a 
hard time of finding the resources they need (Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002: 414), making 
survival problematic.  Yiwu simply did not have the standing or resources to allow it to 
focus on issues of reputation and status.  Still, gradually, based simply on its own 
performance, Yiwu became increasingly well known.  Such reputational changes, 
however, were two-sided.  While viewed as successful economically, Yiwu was also 
becoming known as a low-status opportunist, relying upon questionable practices of 
imitation, the sale of poor-quality products, and misrepresentation to benefit itself.  
Positive change regarding this standing, however, would have to wait for various   32 
developments, including improved economic conditions, the impact of outside forces 
(brought on by an increased openness), and a better resource position before taking place. 
 
A Second Phase of the Celebrity Development Process:  The Impact of Economic 
Jolts, Increased Openness, and Resource Abundance on Yiwu’s Legitimacy, 
Reputation, and Status 
Researchers theorize that a major source of organizational change is one associated 
with environmental jolts, or points of unexpected and discontinuous transformation 
(Meyer, 1982; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994).  Various events, happenings like financial 
disasters, the unanticipated death of a top leader, a sudden loss of legitimacy, etc., often 
act to destabilize existing conditions (often through sharp changes in resource availability 
(Park & Mezias, 2005: 987; Wan & Yiu, 2009: 792)), giving rise to a situation where the 
probability for other changes increases sharply.   Such “jolts” result in periods of 
instability, and are often times of crisis.  But as with the Chinese character for crisis, 
weiji (composed of a character for danger and one for opportunity), such periods 
inherently possess both the possibility of ruin and the potential for organizational gain. 
In the late 1980s, Yiwu experienced such a severe jolt.  It was an event that set in 
motion a series of changes that had significant impacts on Yiwu, and upon its legitimacy, 
reputation and status.  It was also a happening that, surprisingly, began the process by 
which Yiwu’s celebrity expanded greatly.  The event was the Tiananmen Crisis of 1989, 
an event wherein the Chinese government violently put an end to Beijing student 
protests, taking place in support of democratic change.  As a result of this incident there   33 
occurred a deep questioning of the appropriateness of China’s markets and market 
reforms, generally, and of Yiwu, in particular.  In the words of one interviewee, this 
situation was “a great shock for Yiwu” (2/24/09 Yiwu interview).  Not only did many 
conservative officials begin to harshly criticize and attack Yiwu, but many local residents 
also began to question Yiwu’s future.  There was, in fact, an exodus by many locals away 
from market-related activity.  The future of the marketplace was in doubt.  A large 
segment of the Yiwu population was “very upset.  They felt like Yiwu’s future was over” 
(1/16/09 Beijing interview).  In reaction, many Yiwu officials sought to tone down 
Yiwu’s standing.  But, other officials, led by a vice-mayor, Chen Zhengxing, took 
aggressive efforts to promote the positives of Yiwu’s activities.  Working in conjunction 
with private businesspersons, the Yiwu government spent RMB 20,000 on a 
documentary that appeared on the national television network, CCTV, which featured 
Yiwu’s marketplace and told stories of the new riches being made.  The documentary 
featured a famous CCTV reporter, Zhao Zhongxiang, and although it lasted less than 15 
minutes, it was enough to assure people of Yiwu’s standing, as well as the acceptability 
of markets.  This is because the common people (lao bai xing) reasoned correctly that the 
central government would only allow subjects possessing governmental support to be 
featured on CCTV.  The documentary was the first time that Yiwu had received such 
national exposure.  It made people aware of Yiwu’s existence, and it provided Yiwu with 
a needed shot of legitimacy. 
But, something else it did was to focus attention on Yiwu, and this had multiple 
consequences.  For one thing, it attracted even more outsiders to the market.  Yiwu 
became known as a place where one could make money, and many moved to Yiwu in   34 
search of riches.  These outsiders, although generally not well educated, brought with 
them many skills and forms of experience that had previously been missing from the 
market.  A positive of Yiwu was its ability to attract and fit these persons into its market.  
Many interviewees attributed this ability to the local government’s fair treatment of the 
outsiders (2/27/09 Yiwu interview).  In the words of a Fujian businessperson, who first 
arrived in Yiwu in 1992, “Yiwu was quite successful in integrating people form Fujian, 
Guangdong, and other places in Zhejiang, particularly Wenzhou and Taizhou, into its 
market.  Without these persons Yiwu would not have developed as it has.  Each of the 
places has its own unique capabilities, and the merging of these strengths resulted in 
significant competitive advantage for the market…In fact, the more open Yiwu became, 
the more its situation improved” (2/26/09 Yiwu interview).   
The increasing attention being focused on Yiwu also resulted in more notice taken 
of it by others, however, particularly members of the political realm.  As one interviewee 
commented, “It was not until the opening of the market to the outside that there was 
strong pressure on us to become more and more rationalized.  There came to be 
significant pressure on us from higher-level government officials to make changes…At 
the same time, we also faced pressure to go to the outside to monitor other markets:  
Shenyang, Chengdu, Chongqing, Xinjiang, Taizhou, and Wenzhou.  Other market actors 
also increasingly came to see us.  These developments gave rise to forces for change” 
(2/11/09a Yiwu interview).  According to another interviewee, one force for change arose 
due to a realization that Yiwu faced strong competition from other markets:  “We found 
that the other markets were getting close to the level of Yiwu, and we felt the pressure to 
improve” (2/11/09b Yiwu interview).  The increasing awareness of others regarding   35 
Yiwu’s situation was coupled with Yiwu’s increasing awareness of them.   A true market 
field began to arise characterized by ongoing mutual monitoring by involved actors.  
Market hierarchies and standards emerged, structuring action and rationalizing 
competition.  This resulted in a heightening of overall legitimacy, the formation of 
reputations (via a comparison of performance outcomes), and the engendering of field-
based status differences (based on such elements as differences in price and quality, 
customer share, types of product, etc.).  While facing strong competition, Yiwu was 
comparatively well positioned with regard to the three constructs, and had begun to 
distinguish itself via its strong performance.  The foundations of Yiwu’s celebrity 
standing were becoming set. 
Still, Yiwu needed to improve itself more.  The entry into the marketplace of 
additional market participants had begun to strain Yiwu’s infrastructure and changes 
were required.  Yiwu’s “infrastructure situation was not good. There was insufficient 
electricity, water, sanitation, and transport networks, etc.” (10/11/08 Yiwu interview).  
While a factor attracting actors to Yiwu was the market’s low cost structure, particularly 
in terms of the small amount of taxes being charged, market-operating revenues were 
consequently too low.  This, coupled with the fact that money for development from the 
Provincial government was minimal, meant that Yiwu needed to develop other resource 
sources. It had to take action, and this required interacting with key members of its social 
environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 19).  The individuals of importance were power 
holders within the political realm 
Yiwu needed the support of these power holders to improve its situation.  This is 
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needed the OK of authorities to pursue its strategy.  Yiwu hoped to become the first city 
of its size to try and implement an approach that had previously only been allowed in 
Guangdong Province’s Shenzhen and Zhuhai cities, places of a much larger size.  It 
required the approval of the Zhejiang Provincial Government’s Commission for 
Economic Restructuring (Tigaiwei), at the time led by Dong Chaocai, a market supporter.  
Market-supporting Dong also supported Yiwu.  He therefore allowed Yiwu special 
permission to implement its chosen strategy.  The successful implementation of this 
strategy was critical to Yiwu’s growth and subsequent celebrity.  The strategy involved 
making Yiwu into an experimental zone, wherein the provincial government gave Yiwu 
the ability to auction off, in measured amounts, the rights to local land, providing the 
people with the property they needed to build office space, factories, residential units, 
and other real-estate assets.  In return, the city gained a substantial source of revenue.  
The results of the policy were quick and considerable:   
After  the  policy  was  implemented  the  city  took  off.  The  whole  situation 
completely  changed.  Buildings  were  built  all  over.  The  people  and  the 
government both became rich. There were new roads built all over, too. The 
people’s focus on market activities also increased substantially. Their total focus 
became one of making money (12/8/08a Yiwu interview). 
 
Yiwu administrators used their new resources to improve the market.  They initiated 
various infrastructure-enhancing projects, which involved the construction of new, 
improved markets.  They also began a stronger focus on market behavior improvement.  
One market participant noted that, prior to taking this action, “Yiwu was beginning to 
become known as a center of fake products” (2/24/09 Yiwu interview).  And, according   37 
to a Bureau of Industry and Commerce official working in Yiwu at the time:  
 
Product copying was quite extensive, but truthfully many copiers didn’t even 
know that what they were doing was improper. Educational efforts relating to 
such copying really took off once Yiwu began opening up in the early 1990s.  
People were arrested, fake products confiscated and destroyed, and propaganda 
efforts made. The reason for initiating these actions was twofold: 1) pressure 
from upper level authorities, and 2) the recognition that counterfeit goods and 
copying  was  not  in  the  interest  of  our  markets.  The  outside  media  and 
representatives from foreign countries had already begun to focus on Yiwu and 
action was needed (12/16/08 Yiwu interview). 
 
Even so, Yiwu still was far from its goal of achieving celebrity.  At a minimum, it 
still lacked legitimacy, and this deficiency restricted the advancement of its reputation, 
status and celebrity.  Although more media attention had begun to be focused on the 
marketplace, the extent of this attention was still not enough to achieve the celebrity 
standing Yiwu sought.  More help was needed.   
 
Becoming a Media Star:  How Yiwu Used Its Resources to Promote Itself and 
Garner Firm-Celebrity 
In China, legitimacy is politically determined.  Power resides in the party and 
government.  The party controls the media, the courts, and also has control over the 
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policies.  Laws and policies are generally written quite severely, but are frequently 
implemented in ways that are weaker than their words would otherwise imply.  Those 
who implement laws, especially with regard to taxes, adherence to standards, and land 
policies, have much discretion as to how the laws will be implemented.  This gives them 
the power, backed up by the police and military, to determine the success or failure of 
any economic entity in China.  The notion of politicized capitalism is a real life 
phenomenon in China.   
Yiwu administrators were constantly aware of this situation, and they knew that 
they needed the power of the polity behind them, if they were to succeed.  How could a 
small place like Yiwu, however, with strong potential, but lacking legitimacy, reputation 
and status, improve its situation?  What was required was some opportunity to form 
connections with the political elite.  Yiwu found such an opportunity in the form of the 
annual China Mayor’s Conference.  The first such conference was held in 1991 and took 
place in Hainan.  Even though a small city, Yiwu sent a contingent to the event.  While 
there, the group lobbied hard to try and garner the right to host the 2
nd conference, to be 
held in 1992, and used some of Yiwu’s growing wealth to market Yiwu to conference 
attendees.  They were successful in their efforts.  The China’s Mayor Association chose 
Yiwu to host the May 1992 event.  In the words of one of those participating in Yiwu’s 
marketing efforts:  “At the time Yiwu had already started to gain some recognition within 
the market community, but outside of this realm it was still little known…We succeeded 
even though Yiwu had little standing. It was totally against the odds. When the 
committee selected us to hold the meeting, we didn’t even have a three star hotel.  Our  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success was predicated on good insight, hard work and a lot of fortuitous luck” (10/20/08 
Hangzhou interview).   
But, even having been chosen to host the meeting it was not clear what mayors 
would attend the event.  The opportunity to host the conference would only be valuable if 
top-ranking mayors agreed to participate.  Yiwu put its focus on obtaining the 
commitment of the then mayor of Beijing, Chen Xitong.  If Chen were to attend and 
found the event to his liking, this would be of great benefit to Yiwu in its quest for 
legitimacy.  But Yiwu was largely unknown, and its status position was low.  The 
likelihood of Chen’s participation thus seemed low.  Chen, however, decided to attend.  
Why did he agree to come?  There were at least two reasons.  First, because of its newly 
obtained wealth (see above), Yiwu had enough resources to pull a successful meeting off.  
It possessed the fundamentals that Chen required. With regard to the second reason, I 
turn to the comments of the person responsible for directing the event:  
 
Our timing was right.  The primary reason Chen decided to come was Deng 
Xiaoping’s strong support of markets. In January-February 1992 Deng had made 
his “southern tour,” but it still had not been publicly disclosed. Sometime around 
this period, knowing of Deng’s trip, Chen had given a market-supporting speech. 
The  speech  was  published  in  The Peoples’Daily,  meaning  it  had  found  favor 
among  key  power  holders.  Holding  the  meeting  in  Yiwu,  a  center  of  market 
activity, worked in with Chen’s thinking.  Fortunately, the meeting went well and 
received  strong  press  coverage.    At  its  conclusion  we  took  Chen  to  tour  the 
markets, and whenever we went people welcomed him wildly.  It was incredible.  
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Yiwu to show them the power of markets. He also ordered Beijing’s stores to 
start purchasing Yiwu’s products.  Prior to Chen’s arrival, Yiwu’s markets were 
relatively  closed.    After  the  trip,  everything  changed,  including  people’s 
attitudes. The provincial government took notice; so did the leaders in Jinhua (the 
city overseeing Yiwu).  Many dignitaries began to visit, and Yiwu’s standing 
improved almost instantaneously (Ibid). 
 
Following Chen’s visit, Zhejiang and central-level media coverage of Yiwu 
expanded significantly, as did the number of high-level visitors from other places.  
Suddenly possessing legitimacy, Yiwu became the poster child of those supporting 
market reforms, many of whom were China’s senior leaders.  These officials had 
suddenly taken notice of the market, and had power.  They used their power to promote 
Yiwu, especially in influencing the reporting of the media.  While authors have discussed 
in fearful tones the increasingly centralized character of the media in the US (Bagdikian, 
2000), citing that now only six major firms control most of what is propagated, such 
warnings are actually not of much relevance in China, where the communist party 
oversees all media workings.  In China, the polity controls what will be reported and to 
what degree.  
This situation was of great benefit to Yiwu.  Having achieved legitimation, Yiwu 
became a favorite media topic.  But, not only was the increased scope of Yiwu’s 
coverage of benefit, but so was its tone, which was overwhelmingly positive.  But, as one 
reporter commented, this is not unusual. 
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In China reporting takes place using the following logic: zhengmian wei zhu, 
which means focus on the positive. There are less than five percent of articles 
each week that focus on real social problems. For example, out of 60 pages per 
week, maybe two will examine problems. This is the tradition in China for 
party  newspapers.  We  are  a  propaganda  mechanism  (10/16/08  Yiwu 
interview). 
 
Possessing the attention and acceptance of the media, and with resources at its 
disposal, Yiwu administrators took the initiative to promote themselves further.  Such 
efforts have taken various forms.  First, Yiwu has put great effort into forming and 
maintaining networks with political leaders.  The Yiwu government annually spends a 
substantial amount of money to invite outside officials to Yiwu for all expense paid 
junkets.  About 40% of all officials coming to Yiwu each year receive such treatment.  
Given that in 2007 Yiwu “had 500 groups visiting that included officials of a vice 
minister and/or deputy provincial governor status or above” (6/13/08 Yiwu 
interview), this can add up to a big expense.  For example, Yiwu “invited leaders 
from Tibet to the city for a 3 day stay, spending RMB 100,000 to do so” (Ibid).  As to 
why these officials receive such treatment, one former official notes that:   
 
Officials not only control media access, but they also control policy, and if 
Yiwu is able to garner policy benefits these will be of great advantage to it in 
its competitive standing with other places.  For example, because of policy 
allowances granted to us, we can now manage easily the visas of visiting   42 
businesspersons.  We can also better handle disputes between foreigners 
and locals.  These are advantages not enjoyed by other places (11/3/08 
Yiwu interview). 
 
Second, Yiwu allocates significant amounts of resources on the promotion of itself.  
When asked if “other markets advertise themselves like Yiwu,” a former vice director of 
Yiwu’s propaganda department replied, “Not to the extent Yiwu does. Our expenditures 
in this area are significantly greater than those of other cities of similar and even greater 
size. Yiwu faces little competition with regard to propaganda efforts from other market 
areas. One reason for this is because Yiwu has more money than they do, and this is 
directly the result of our special land use policies” (11/3/08 Yiwu interview). According 
to this same official, the Yiwu city government allocates its propaganda office four to 
five times the amount of funds that the propaganda offices of other comparably sized 
cities receive. The propaganda department’s budget is RMB 20 to 25 million annually 
and in addition to these amounts there are various private propaganda initiatives 
undertaken as well (strongly encouraged by the local government) (Ibid). The amount 
that Yiwu spends on propaganda is more than 100% of the combined total spent by all of 
the other cities in the Jinhua district in which Yiwu is located (12/11/08 Yiwu interview). 
Yiwu’s district includes at least five other cities of similar size as Yiwu. Each year, more 
than ten million RMB are spent on China Central Television (CCTV) advertisements 
alone. In addition, the city has an office of promotion in Frankfurt, Germany as well as 
offices in Hangzhou and Shanghai. The city also advertises in Shanghai and Hong Kong, 
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 43 
city also sends Yiwu government and market‐related officials on trips to other areas 
of China, with at least 100 such trips taking place each year:  “These trips are made 
to attract new or higher quality businesses to our markets and they are also 
effective in promoting Yiwu’s overall reputation as well.  They tend to be well 
covered by the local medias in the places we visit” (6/13/08 Yiwu interview).   
Third, Yiwu puts heavy emphasis on making it easy and comfortable for the media 
to cover to it.  For example, it offers the media various forms of encouragement to 
undertake such efforts.  This assistance started as early as the late 1980s, and 
includes periodic invitations to favored reporters to come to Yiwu for a good time.  
It also encompasses the writing of stories for reporters by the propaganda 
department, as well as the production and dissemination of “interesting” stories.  In 
the words of one reporter, “Yiwu has been very systematic in its promotion 
strategies.  Yiwu’s leaders have also given us great support” (11/01/08 Yiwu 
interview).  Such support has included direct payoffs.  For example, one former 
People’s Daily reporter, who is an Yiwu native, noted that in 1998 the city began a 
policy wherein it provides bonuses to any reporter who publishes a story or picture 
(with caption) in a newspaper or magazine of a provincial status or above.  In the 
words of this reporter, “I was making RMB80,000‐90,000 per year just from writing 
about Yiwu.  Prior to this, Yiwu offered rewards, but the amounts were less.  In 
other places, no such rewards are offered or if they are available the amounts are 
significantly lower” (12/04/08 Yiwu interview).   44 
Fourth, Yiwu has also intentionally and ongoingly attempted to characterize 
itself as distinctive.  With every passing year, Yiwu has seemed to initiate some new 
policy or form of action that in some way sets Yiwu apart from other markets.  A 
former media representative commented on this saying “Yiwu’s greatest advantage 
now is that it is distinctive, it is newsworthy.  We played on this advantage and tried 
to build on it.  We needed to because without provincial and central government 
support in China it’s difficult to succeed here” (11/01/08 Yiwu interview).  Another 
reporter observed that, “There is much to write about here.  Other places are helpful 
in providing information, too, but Yiwu has more newsworthy information.  The 
government purposely positions its activities in such a way to make them attractive 
to news purveyors.  They also have the resources to promote themselves, and spend 
a great deal on such endeavors” (11/22/08 Yiwu interview).   
A fifth way Yiwu promotes itself is by seeking outside accreditation and 
certification.  Researchers have cited such factors as being key to legitimacy, 
reputation and status attainment (Martens, et al., 2007; Rao, 1994; Rindova, et al., 
2005).  Some of Yiwu’s recent achievements in this area have been its being named 
by one of China’s top magazines, “China’s Most Newsworthy City of 2008‐2009,” as 
well as achieving designation as a “2008 Zhejiang Province Safe City,” “The County 
Level City in China Having the Most Foreign Residents,” and “The County Level City 
in China Having the Highest Rate of Money Turnover.”  Yiwu is also the only county 
level city in China that can process foreign visas, and the only county level city able 
to adjudicate the legal cases of foreigners.  It has been designated China’s largest 
interior port, and the only city that allows foreigners to participate in its People’s   45 
Congress (the city selected the author as a People’s Congressperson in 2008).  The 
central government has certified Yiwu “An Hygienic City,” “An Environmental City,” 
“A Forest City,” “A Park City,” and many more.2   
A sixth way that Yiwu attempts to enhance its celebrity standing is through 
the formation of networks with other high status (not just political) actors.  
Actually, these networks are both instrumental and legitimizing.  For example, one 
Yiwu administrator commented on Yiwu’s establishment of ties with intellectuals: 
 
We  try  to  attract  the  attention  of  scholars  and  experts,  people  who  normally 
would not be interested in a community as small as Yiwu.  In turn, we can learn 
from them and improve.  This helps us greatly, especially since our educational 
backgrounds are not that great.  But we are willing to learn, and we want to learn 
from those who know more than we do (12/4/08b Yiwu interview). 
 
 There is also the realization that these networks are legitimating as well.  And, Yiwu 
plays on this, commissioning famous intellectuals to write books and articles about 
it.  Even though most of the writings are largely propaganda, they still carry with 
them the aura of scholarship, and this acts to improve Yiwu’s legitimacy, reputation, 
and status.  Examples of such works include:  Weishenma Shi Yiwu? [Why Yiwu?], 
written by two Zhejiang University scholars; Yiwu Fazhan zhi Wenhua Tanyuan [The 
Cultural Roots of Yiwu’s Development], penned by a contingent of professors from 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China’s Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing; and, Yiwu Shangjuan [Yiwu’s Business 
Districts], by a professor at the Zhejiang Communist Party School.  The books all 
stress several things.  First, they all discuss Yiwu’s distinctiveness, indicating how it 
is different from others.  They all also refer to Yiwu’s early standing as a non‐
conformer, as a protagonist in a dramatized story of conflict and change (Rindova, 
et al., 2006: 56).  But, in addition, the books also indicate the fact that Yiwu has 
likewise transformed itself into a special kind of conforming status.  The books 
portray Yiwu as becoming the exemplar of a now established field, distinguished in 
the sense that it stands out from its competitors, but now an over‐conformer rather 
than a non‐conformer as before.  One of the books includes a quote from China’s 
former Minister of Commerce (and now party secretary of the city Chongqing) 
stating that, “If a person wants to research China’s socialist market economy, then 
that person must go to Yiwu” (Huang & Zhang, 2007, P. 3).  Yiwu has become the 
new paragon of China’s emerging form of economic development. 
Finally, Yiwu also attempts to develop ties with others it considers to be of 
high status.  One group targeted has been foreign businesspersons.  Yiwu ongoingly 
puts out stories discussing the numbers of foreigners operating in its markets and 
living in its city.  This number is now well over 10,000.  It also highlights the 
establishment by high‐level foreign buyers of buying offices within the market.  
Yiwu administrators clearly recognize the legitimacy and reputational value of ties 
to high status actors, and do their best to focus attention to these ties. 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DISCUSSION 
Having detailed the process by which Yiwu achieved firm-celebrity, the discussion 
now shifts to a focus on the relation of the Yiwu story to the six, previously outlined 
propositions.  Each of the propositions will be dealt with separately. 
The first proposition states that “Legitimacy is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for firm-celebrity attainment.”  At the start of its existence, Yiwu had low 
levels of legitimacy, reputation, and status.  Its legitimacy was under-developed for 
several reasons.  To understand one of these reasons, I consider a certain definition of 
organizational legitimacy, which states that organizational legitimacy is the degree to 
which a firm is recognized and accepted (Hannan &  Caroll, 1992).  Another way of 
referring to this is to consider the extent to which a firm has attained propriety and 
validity, two factors referred to earlier (Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006: 55).   But, 
early in its development Yiwu was an unknown entity, and in many ways this was a 
purposeful situation.  Relevant members of the Yiwu community and their supporters, 
including Zhejiang Provincial leaders, were happy to keep Yiwu at a low level of 
recognition.  In China, markets were still not fully accepted, and Yiwu was clearly a 
market-related entity.  It was better to maintain Yiwu under wraps and wait to see what 
happened.  That is, Yiwu’s celebrity progress depended to a large degree on the 
marketplace’s existing macro-level environments.  This is because, according to 
Rindova, et al., “one defining characteristic of celebrity is that a social actor attracts 
large-scale public attention” (2006: 50).  If Yiwu were to achieve firm-celebrity, it 
needed to become known, but to do so it required legitimacy, a legitimacy that depended 
on macro-level trends.   48 
Yet, even having attained a certain level of legitimacy, as was the case for Yiwu 
after the 1989 CCTV broadcast, firm-celebrity for Yiwu was not immediately 
forthcoming.  At the time, Yiwu was simply one of many markets.  It was distinctive, but 
because of macro-level based concerns regarding the overall appropriateness of markets, 
it continued to lack status.  Powerful actors, particularly in the political realm, were not 
willing to form known ties with it.  Also, Yiwu’s reputation was mixed.  On the one 
hand, it was a successful organization, in that it was surviving (not always easy for a new 
firm), and its members were doing well.  But on the other hand, it had many deficiencies 
and lacked resources (most importantly money) required to improve upon its weaknesses.  
Yiwu’s deficiencies, for example, inadequate infrastructures, questionable behaviors by 
its participants, and not yet well-organized systems of operation (e.g., there existed in 
particular problems with logistics systems), adversely impacted its reputation, and also 
restrained the marketplace from promoting itself too much.  Thus, even possessing 
legitimacy, firm-celebrity was not forthcoming.  While legitimacy was needed for firm-
celebrity to arise, legitimacy alone was not enough.  This suggests there is support for 
this first proposition. 
The second proposition relates to reputation.  It asserts that, “For new firms, located 
in emerging organizational fields, although legitimacy precedes reputation in importance, 
the reputation-seeking process is a critical step in the attainment of firm-celebrity.  This is 
because, if they are to achieve celebrity, firms need to distinguish themselves from their 
competitors.  This involves the establishment of reputation.”  In reference to this 
proposition, it must first be recognized that reputation is relational in nature.  That is, 
implicit in reputation are processes of comparison.  Reputation embodies a ranked   49 
structure, with firms being graded in a top-down sequence.  For new firms in emerging 
organizational fields, such rankings are not possible.  This can be shown by Yiwu’s 
experience.  Initially, Yiwu was not even that well aware of its competition, but rather 
focused more on its own activities.  There was little early mutual monitoring among 
competitors.  Standard forms of reputation frameworks could not form, at least with 
respect to comparisons made between marketplace competitors.   
Instead, early on, Yiwu’s reputation was founded more upon its standing as a new 
form of development.  It was being compared with other developmental forms, rather 
than other marketplaces, and its reputation was emerging on the basis of this comparison.  
Yiwu framed itself as a pioneer, as an institutional entrepreneur fighting to survive, and 
doing so in the only way it knew how, through a reliance on the entrepreneurial efforts of 
its people to carve out for themselves a new niche of existence.  Yiwu’s development was 
predicated on markets first, and production second.  This differed from all other places, 
where production came first, followed by markets.  Yiwu thus garnered a reputation as an 
entity able to find new ways to provide its stakeholders with value.  It came to be seen as 
a developmental innovator, a place embodying processes that were unique as compared 
to the situations of others.  The reputation-forming process did not depend upon a 
comparison between marketplaces, but rather on a comparison of developmental forms.  
This impacted Yiwu’s own progress and helped it to achieve celebrity.  Reputation 
formation was thus an important factor in Yiwu’s ability to achieve celebrity.  There 
exists qualified support for the proposition. 
The focus of Yiwu’s positioning, however, changed over time.  This is the 
assertion made in the third proposition, a complement to the proposition above, which   50 
states that, “For firm-celebrity to develop further, there is a need for the establishment of 
a positively perceived firm-reputation, one that is increasingly associated with over-
conformance, as opposed to non-conformance.”  The framing of Yiwu was one that 
initially positioned the market as an innovative mechanism of development rather than as 
a marketplace.  Yiwu characterized itself as a place providing opportunity to those 
without other significant life chances, people like farmers and poor laborers, individuals 
who had seemingly been neglected in the development processes of other locales.  No 
special talents or relationships were necessary in Yiwu.  Anyone willing to work hard and 
possessing a bit of luck could succeed.  In this sense, Yiwu was different than other 
places.  It was an open place and full of opportunity.  This made it special.  Yiwu’s early 
reputation was predicated on its standing as an anomaly.   
Yiwu was not simply a developmental approach, however.  All things said, it was 
still a marketplace.  But, a reputation-formation process based on a comparison between 
marketplaces had to wait until a field of marketplaces came into being.  A certain level of 
recognition and acceptance of marketplaces needed to form before such a reputational 
basis could emerge.   
Once an emerging organizational field achieves a certain level of legitimacy, 
however, if a firm’s celebrity development is to continue, it must then begin to 
distinguish itself from other members of its field, those with whom it is naturally 
compared.  This is generally not a natural process, in which one singular firm is a clear 
and recognized paradigm of “the important changes [occurring] in industries and society 
in general” (Rindova, et al., 2006: 52).  There are potentially, depending on how the 
situation is framed, many such firms, and not all firms can take on the “paradigm” role.    51 
One firm must separate itself from its competition.  This suggests the development of a 
ranking structure.  This ranking structure, however, is not one based on status, in the 
sense that a network of relations determines it.  Such relations have not yet had the time 
needed to form.  This structure is rather one dependent on the signals being emitted by 
organizational-field members.  This, however, is analogous to reputation.  That is, the 
development of firm-celebrity depends on reputation.   
In the case of Yiwu, a key foundation of Yiwu’s reputation and hence its celebrity 
was Yiwu’s relative success, particularly its financial success (Fobrum & Shanley, 1990 
pointed to financial success as key to firm reputation formation), as compared to its 
competitors.  It developed a reputation as an organization that successfully overcame the 
odds to become a high performer and ongoing innovator, doing so while providing its 
stakeholders with value.  Yiwu also came to be seen as an entity famous for its leadership 
abilities within its field, that is, an over-conformer.  This differed from its previous 
standing as a non-conforming anomaly.    There is evidence in support of this proposition 
The next proposition deals with status.  It posits:  “For a new, un-established firm, 
status is not a necessary condition for the development of firm-celebrity.  Once celebrity 
is achieved, however, status is required to attain the over-conforming standing needed for 
celebrity’s continuance and further development.”  According to Rindova, et al., “status 
derives not so much from a firm’s past actions and investments but, rather, from 
observation of its affiliations with prominent network partners and its centrality within 
market exchange networks” (2006: 55).  Early on, Yiwu had little status, and it also had 
little legitimacy, reputation, or fame.  Yiwu administrators put their priority on achieving 
legitimacy.  To do so, however, meant relying on the influence of powerful individuals,   52 
particularly actors within the polity, who supported market reforms.  And though these 
actors were not particularly willing to form openly perceived ties with Yiwu, there were 
behind the scenes ties and these were important to Yiwu’s legitimation efforts.  Even so, 
prior to Yiwu’s success in forming open relationships with well-known, high-status 
individuals, like the mayor of Beijing, Chen Xitong, the market had only a modicum of 
legitimacy.  This impacted its ability to become a celebrity.  It appears then that, in fact, 
based on the Yiwu situation, status formation is a prerequisite to celebrity.  A change in 
the wording of the proposition above is required.  Open ties to powerful actors are not 
necessary for the development of celebrity, but some form of relationship with these actor 
types is required.  It is only through such relationships that full legitimacy, a precursor to 
celebrity, can be achieved.  The proposition thus needs rewriting. 
Still, with regard to the second part of the proposition: the perceived need for 
celebrity actors to possess ties with high status others so as to become known as over-
conformers, the evidence suggests that this is true, at least with respect to Yiwu.  Yiwu 
has used its resources to curry and maintain such ties, and in doing so has successfully 
perpetuated its celebrity.  The motivations behind such actions relate to the realizations 
that the networks that an actor forms with high status actors are not only able to influence 
the perceptions of others in the field, but also that the ties aid in the garnering of a 
particular resource distribution.  They do so not only through actual power over decision-
making, but also based on their greater access to information and knowledge.  As a result 
of their high-status standing, the actors are better informed.  There is the awareness that if 
Yiwu is to continue to succeed, it needs resources and such access depends on its ability 
to maintain a network of relationships with high-status actors.    53 
The fifth proposition states, “In a situation characterized by politicized capitalism, 
the status required by a celebrity-firm to transform itself into an over-conforming actor 
should depend on the development of ties between the organization and relevant, high-
ranking political leaders.”  Evidence for this can be drawn from the discussion above and 
the comments of the interviewee referred to earlier in the paper, in which this person 
related the importance of political networks to Yiwu for two specified reasons:  access to 
media coverage, and advantages relating to policy formulation.  In China, a nation 
characterized by politicized capitalism, the polity controls media access.  Good relations 
with the polity, therefore, result in media advantages.  Rindova, et al. stressed the 
importance of the media in celebrity attainment.  Hence, this explains the importance of 
polity contacts.  A similar situation exists with respect to policy formation.  For the firm 
hoping to be seen as an over-conformer, such contacts are particularly important.  This is 
because, under a context characterized by political capitalism, achieving leadership in 
any field is a politically related process.  It is members of the polity who have the ability 
to decide who will and who will not succeed.  Evidence in support of the proposition 
exists. 
The last, referred-to proposition is the following:  “In order to successfully attain 
celebrity standing, firms must possess the abilities needed to develop and acquire the 
resources they need to achieve the desired celebrity outcome.”    The Yiwu case showed 
this proposition to be especially true.  Prior to Yiwu’s development of a means to garner 
needed resources (in particular, money), the marketplace had not achieved its potential.  
It was only when a new source of wealth became available that the marketplace began to 
takeoff, at least from a celebrity standpoint.  Still, it must be noted that it was not simply   54 
the availability of resources that was important, it was also the way in which Yiwu used 
these resources, applying them to the improvement of infrastructures, the development of 
useful networks of relations, and the creation of a grand overall plan for the future.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The focus of this paper has been to show the inter-relations between structures, and 
how these processes shape organizational hierarchies.  The paper examined the manner 
by which the social constructions legitimacy, reputation, and status influence the 
development of organization-differentiating firm celebrity.  It relied upon a case study of 
a now famous marketplace in China, Yiwu, to carry out its purpose, finding that the three 
elements are actively involved in developmental outcomes.  Another finding of the paper 
is that resources matter, as do the manner in which they are applied.  In the case of Yiwu, 
Yiwu administrators were successful in their attempts to garner the resources they 
believed they needed, and used these resources to facilitate the emergence of legitimacy, 
reputation, and status for their organization.  Well-though out application of resources, in 
conjunction with the development of legitimacy, reputation, and status were the means by 
which a firm-differentiating celebrity was attained.     55 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TABLE A1:  RESULTS OF CLOTHING MARKET INTERVIEWS 
 
Interviews one through 19 were conducted in Wuhan’s Hanzhengjie market area, 
those from 20‐39 in Beijing’s Bairong Market, and the 39‐59 interviews in Jinan’s 
Luokou Market. 
 
Column One:  Interview Number 
Column Two:  Home area of interviewee 
Column Three:  Question One‐“Have you ever been to Yiwu?” 
Column Four:  Question Two‐“Have you heard of Yiwu?” 
Column Five:  Question Three‐“What characteristics are most representative of the 
Yiwu market?” 
Column Six:  Question Four‐“Do you think any other market in China can compare 
with Yiwu?” 
Column Seven:  Question Five‐“Can you think of any negatives associated with the 
Yiwu market?” 
 
 
Int. #  Home  Q. 1  Q. 2  Q. 3  Q. 4  Q. 5 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